Divided on AI, Wary of Its Power
Partisan fault lines and bipartisan common ground in a 50‑state survey of more than 38,000 Americans
David Lazer, Ata Aydin Uslu, John Wihbey, Alisa Zomer, Sarah Bernt
Research Report
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October 23, 2026
Executive Summary
Americans are divided on artificial intelligence (AI), with a widening partisan gap in how much they trust AI companies to do what is right. This report draws primarily on the latest survey of more than 38,000 Americans, fielded from June 21 to August 11, 2026, while earlier surveys provide context for changes in trust over time. With samples in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, it examines public opinion about AI companies, infrastructure, applications, and policy, including state differences in trust, self-rated AI skill, and support for local data centers.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, December 2025, June 2026, July 2026, weighted national sample.
Most Americans (54%) would not support a new AI data center in their own community, although Republicans are more supportive than Democrats. Republicans are also more likely than Democrats to trust AI companies and more supportive of using AI in security and military applications. Among uses involving decisions about individuals, medical diagnosis and treatment is the only one that more Republicans support than oppose. Independents are less trusting of AI companies than either Democrats or Republicans.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, December 2025, June 2026, July 2026, weighted national sample.
Despite their differences, Democrats and Republicans agree on several AI policies. Majorities of both parties support government retraining programs and portable lifelong learning accounts. The two parties hold similar views on exporting advanced AI, and majorities in both say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy. Renewable energy is also the most common choice for powering AI data centers in both parties (58% of Democrats and 44% of Republicans).

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, December 2025, June 2026, July 2026, weighted national sample.
Key Findings
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22% of Americans would support a new AI data center in their own community; 54% would not
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70% of Republican men with graduate degrees would support a local data center — the standout subgroup in the education-by-gender comparison
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Within 4 percentage points between Democrats and Republicans on four AI-policy questions: job retraining, lifelong learning accounts, exports of advanced AI, and the influence of tech leaders
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66% of independents do not trust AI companies — the highest level of distrust among Republicans, Democrats and independents
Interactive map: click on the question below to see how data varies by state.
Americans’ views of AI show partisan divisions, differences across states, and areas of bipartisan agreement. Just 22% of Americans would support a new AI data center in their own community, while 54% would not. Republicans are more supportive than Democrats overall, and highly educated Republican men are especially likely to be supportive: 70% of Republican men with graduate degrees would support a data center, compared with 43% of Democratic men with graduate degrees and 36% of Republican women with graduate degrees. The survey also tested what people know about data centers, asking whether six statements — three true and three false — were accurate. For each false statement, those who accepted it were much more likely to support a local data center than those who rejected it.
Does any of this vary by state?
Yes, and on some measures the state differences are substantial. The map below shows the survey estimate for every state and DC across a range of AI questions. The differences are largest for self-rated AI skill, trust in AI companies and views of data centers, while the share who rate “concerned” 8 to 10 on a 1-to-10 scale describing their feelings about the rise of AI is relatively similar across states.
The map shows the raw survey results. Choose a question to see how responses vary across the country. Because each state estimate is based on a sample, small differences between states should not be treated as precise rankings. The map is most useful for seeing broad patterns rather than deciding that one state is definitively higher or lower than another.
Some measures vary more across states than others. After taking the uncertainty in each state’s survey estimate into account, the survey shows comparatively larger state differences in self-rated AI skill, trust in AI companies, some perceptions of data centers, and the preference for powering data centers with renewable energy. The share who rate “concerned” 8 to 10 on the 1-to-10 feelings scale varies much less.
The next question names the states at the top and bottom of the measures that vary most.
data highlights
Trust in AI companies ranges from 29% in Montana to 48% in Virginia. Self-rated AI skill ranges from 30% in Vermont to 63% in the District of Columbia. Among the 50 states, support for a new data center in one’s own community ranges from 14% in Vermont to 29% in Louisiana. The share of respondents with a high degree of concern about the rise of AI is relatively similar across states.
How much do Americans trust AI companies?
Most Americans do not trust AI companies to do what is right. 60% say they trust AI companies “not too much” or “not at all,” while 40% say “a lot” or “some.” Only 9% say they trust them “a lot.”
The survey asked how much people trust AI (artificial intelligence) companies to do what is right, on a four-point scale from “a lot” to “not at all.”
31% say they do not trust AI companies “at all,” and another 28% say “not too much.” On the trusting side, 31% say “some” and 9% say “a lot.”
The national figure has remained near 40% across the three times the question has been asked: 39% in December 2025, 39% in the May–July 2026 survey and 40% in this survey. The partisan gap widened over the same period.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
Who trusts AI companies?
Trust rises with education and household income and is higher among men and in cities. It is lowest among 18-to-24-year-olds, at 30% — the age group most likely to have used AI.
Men report higher trust in AI companies than women. 46% of men trust AI companies “a lot” or “some,” compared with 36% of women, a gap of 10 percentage points.
Young adults report the lowest trust despite the highest exposure to AI. Trust is 30% among 18-to-24-year-olds, rises to 45% among 25-to-44-year-olds, then eases to 41% and 38% in the two older groups. 89% of 18-to-24-year-olds have used an AI tool, compared with 54% of adults 65 and older, and 63% of the youngest group describe themselves as skilled with AI. Among those who work, they are also the most likely to say AI will eventually cost people who do work like theirs their jobs (60%), and they are the most opposed to AI in hiring decisions (59%).
Trust rises with education, especially at the graduate level. It is 36%, 38% and 37% across the first three education categories, then rises to 43% among those with a bachelor’s degree and 54% among graduate-degree holders.
Trust also rises with household income. It is 37% in households earning under $50,000, 41% between $50,000 and $100,000, and 53% at $100,000 or more.
Urban adults report higher trust than rural adults. Trust is 44% in urban areas, 40% in the suburbs and 35% in rural areas.
Trust also varies across racial and ethnic groups. Asian (48%), Black (46%) and Hispanic (43%) Americans report higher trust than white Americans (39%); Native Americans report the lowest among the named groups (34%), about the same as the other race/ethnicity category (34%). These are overlapping indicators — respondents could select more than one — so the groups are not mutually exclusive.
These characteristics overlap: education and income travel together, age is tied to both, and race is associated with age, education and party in this sample. Each comparison here describes one characteristic at a time and does not hold the others constant.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
data highlights
Local opposition is widespread, but support rises sharply among highly educated Republican men. Most Americans would not support a new AI data center in their own community: 54% say no, 22% say yes and 23% have no opinion. Republicans are more supportive than Democrats overall, and highly educated Republican men are especially likely to be supportive. Among men with graduate degrees, 70% of Republicans support a local data center, compared with 43% of Democrats; among Republican women with graduate degrees, support is 36%. The first section shows support, opposition and uncertainty separately because some subgroup differences reflect uncertainty rather than opposition.
False beliefs about data centers are associated with greater support. Among those who accept the false statement that data centers are places people go in person to use AI, 48% would support one nearby, compared with 21% of those who correctly reject it. For the false statement that data centers always run entirely on renewable energy, the corresponding figures are 52% and 19%.
Would people accept a data center in their own community?
Most Americans would not support a local AI data center. Highly educated Republican men are especially likely to support one. Nationally, 54% say no, 22% say yes and 23% have no opinion. Among men with graduate degrees, support reaches 70% among Republicans, compared with 43% among Democrats; among Republican women with graduate degrees it is 36%.
Asked nationally, support for a local AI data center is a minority position. 22% of Americans say yes, 54% say no and 23% have no opinion. Republicans are more supportive overall (32%) than Democrats (21%) or independents (16%); support remains below a majority in all three groups.
Highly educated Republican men are especially likely to support a local data center. Among men with graduate degrees, 70% of Republicans would support a local data center, compared with 43% of Democrats and 36% of independents. Among Republican women with graduate degrees, support is 36%.
Within Republican men, support rises sharply with education: from 27% among those without a high-school diploma to 31% among high-school graduates, 34% among those with some college, 47% among bachelor’s-degree holders, and 70% among graduate-degree holders. The comparable increase is much smaller among Democratic men.
Some subgroup differences reflect uncertainty rather than opposition. Women and people with less education are especially likely to choose “no opinion.” The graphic therefore shows support, opposition and no opinion separately rather than treating support as the inverse of opposition.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.



Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
How should AI data centers be powered?
Half of Americans want AI data centers powered by renewable energy, and it is the most common choice in both parties. Renewable energy is chosen by 58% of Democrats and 44% of Republicans; Republicans are more likely than Democrats to also choose nuclear energy, fossil fuels or whatever is cheapest.
The survey asked which energy sources should be used to power AI data centers, and people could choose more than one. Renewable energy is the most common choice (50%), well ahead of “whatever is cheapest” (27%), nuclear energy (17%) and fossil fuels (9%). Another 23% are not sure.
Renewable energy ranks first among Democrats, Republicans and independents alike. Democrats are 14 percentage points more likely than Republicans to choose renewable energy (58% versus 44%). Republicans are 8 points more likely to choose nuclear energy (23% versus 15%), 7 points more likely to choose fossil fuels (15% versus 8%) and 8 points more likely to choose whatever is cheapest (32% versus 24%).
Independents fall between the parties on renewable energy (47%) and are close to Democrats on whatever is cheapest (25%), nuclear energy (15%) and fossil fuels (7%). They are also the most likely to say they are not sure (29%, compared with 20% of Democrats and 20% of Republicans).
Views on government energy investment differ more by party. On a separate question about increased government investment in energy sources, 65% of Republicans support more investment in fossil fuels, compared with 31% of Democrats, and 56% of Republicans support more investment in nuclear energy, compared with 37% of Democrats. Support for more investment in renewable energy is higher among Democrats (79%) than Republicans (61%). The two sets of questions are not directly comparable, but the differences run in the same direction.
Preferences for renewable power also differ from state to state, from 38% in Mississippi to 63% in the District of Columbia (see Section 13).

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
data highlights
Independents are often more skeptical than either party. 66% of independents do not trust AI companies, compared with 61% of Democrats and about half of Republicans. On six of seven measures in the report’s cross-party comparison they report lower trust, support or willingness than either party, and they are the least supportive group on all eleven specific AI applications the survey asked about.
How far apart are the parties?
The Republican–Democratic gap in trust in AI companies is 11 percentage points. Half of Republicans (50%) trust AI companies, while 61% of Democrats and 66% of independents do not. On the seven-point party scale, pure independents have the lowest level of trust (32%) and strong Republicans the highest (52%).
Half of Republicans trust AI companies “a lot” or “some.” A majority of Democrats (61%) and independents (66%) say “not too much” or “not at all.” The Republican–Democratic gap in trust is 11 percentage points.
The three-way party breakdown hides the shape. On the seven-point scale, trust falls across the Republican side — 52% for strong Republicans, 46% for not very strong Republicans and 43% for Republican leaners — and reaches its lowest point among pure independents (32%) and Democratic leaners (33%). On the Democratic side, trust rises to 40% among not very strong Democrats before dipping to 39% among strong Democrats.
Independents report the highest distrust of AI companies (66%), and on six of the seven measures in the third chart below they report lower trust, support or willingness than either party; the exception is renewable energy, where they fall between the two. They are the least willing to host a data center (16%) and the least supportive of government retraining (53%), even though that item shows one of the smallest partisan gaps in the survey. They are also the least likely to agree that technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy (50%, compared with 59% of Democrats and 55% of Republicans), so their lower scores do not map neatly onto pro- or anti-industry sentiment.
Pure independents are one of the largest groups in the survey. They account for 8,508 respondents, just 15 fewer than strong Democrats, the largest category on the seven-point scale among those who answered the trust question. Any account of AI politics built only from a Democrat-versus-Republican comparison leaves out a large group whose answers often fall below both parties rather than between them.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.


Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
data highlights
Democrats and Republicans agree closely on several AI policies. The two parties are within four percentage points on government retraining for workers affected by AI, portable lifelong learning accounts, opposing exports of advanced AI, and whether technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy. On retraining, support is 63% among Democrats and 64% among Republicans; on lifelong learning accounts it is 56% and 57%. Renewable energy is also the most common choice for powering AI data centers in both parties: 58% of Democrats and 44% of Republicans.
Where is there a bipartisan consensus?
Democrats and Republicans are within four percentage points on four AI-policy questions: government retraining, lifelong learning accounts, opposing advanced-AI exports, and whether technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy. Independents fall below both parties on three of the four measures and are close to them on exports.
Support for government retraining is nearly identical across parties. Among Democrats, 63% support government retraining programs for workers affected by AI, compared with 64% of Republicans.
Portable lifelong learning accounts draw virtually identical support. A worker-owned retraining account that travels between jobs draws support from 56% of Democrats and 57% of Republicans.
Majorities in both parties say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy. 59% of Democrats and 55% of Republicans agree. Republicans are more trusting of AI companies overall, yet a majority of them still agree.
Democrats and Republicans are also closely aligned on advanced-AI exports. Among Democrats, 40% say the United States should oppose exporting advanced AI, compared with 42% of Republicans.
Independents fall below both parties on three of the four measures. They are less supportive of retraining (53%) and lifelong learning accounts (47%) and less likely to say technology leaders have too much influence (50%) — between 5 and 12 percentage points below the two parties, calculated before rounding (the rounded figures in the chart give 5 to 11). On exports they are close to both parties: 39% say the United States should oppose exporting advanced AI.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
data highlights
The groups closest to AI show mixed reactions. Young adults and technology workers illustrate that in different ways.
Young adults pair high AI use with low trust in AI companies. 89% of 18-to-24-year-olds have used an AI tool, while 70% do not trust AI companies.
Tech workers pair high trust in AI companies with concern about tech leaders’ influence. 75% trust AI companies and 66% would support a local data center, yet 73% say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy.
Do tech workers simply defer to tech elites?
Tech workers combine high trust in AI companies with concern about tech leaders’ influence. 75% trust AI companies, while 73% say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy, compared with 56% of workers overall.
High trust in AI companies coexists with concern about tech leaders’ policy influence. Tech workers are the most trusting of AI companies and the most likely to say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy — 73%, compared with 56% of all workers. The chart treats trust and concern about influence as separate dimensions rather than opposite ends of one scale.
Across the public, trusting AI companies and wanting tech leaders to have less say over AI policy coexist. Among Americans who trust AI companies “a lot,” 57% say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy, close to the 61% among those who trust them “not at all”; only 14% of the most trusting disagree. Agreement is lowest in the middle of the trust scale (50% among those who trust AI companies “some”), where more people choose “neither.” Tech workers are the clearest case of a wider pattern: trust in the companies does not translate into deference to their leaders. The grid below shows who sits in each combination. Information and technology workers are 3.2 times as likely as all workers to trust AI companies “a lot” and agree that tech leaders have too much influence. Arts workers are overrepresented in the “strongly agree,” “agree” and “neither” squares of the “not at all” column, and adults without a high-school diploma in its “neither,” “disagree” and “strongly disagree” squares.
The same pattern remains after adjustment. Holding education, income, age, gender and party constant, technology workers are 22 percentage points more trusting of AI companies than otherwise similar workers outside the industry and 9 percentage points more likely to say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
data highlights
Would people accept a data center in their own community?
Most Americans would not support a local AI data center. Highly educated Republican men are especially likely to support one. Nationally, 54% say no, 22% say yes and 23% have no opinion. Among men with graduate degrees, support reaches 70% among Republicans, compared with 43% among Democrats; among Republican women with graduate degrees it is 36%.
Asked nationally, support for a local AI data center is a minority position. 22% of Americans say yes, 54% say no and 23% have no opinion. Republicans are more supportive overall (32%) than Democrats (21%) or independents (16%); support remains below a majority in all three groups.
Highly educated Republican men are especially likely to support a local data center. Among men with graduate degrees, 70% of Republicans would support a local data center, compared with 43% of Democrats and 36% of independents. Among Republican women with graduate degrees, support is 36%.
Within Republican men, support rises sharply with education: from 27% among those without a high-school diploma to 31% among high-school graduates, 34% among those with some college, 47% among bachelor’s-degree holders, and 70% among graduate-degree holders. The comparable increase is much smaller among Democratic men.
Some subgroup differences reflect uncertainty rather than opposition. Women and people with less education are especially likely to choose “no opinion.” The graphic therefore shows support, opposition and no opinion separately rather than treating support as the inverse of opposition.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.



Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
How should AI data centers be powered?
Half of Americans want AI data centers powered by renewable energy, and it is the most common choice in both parties. Renewable energy is chosen by 58% of Democrats and 44% of Republicans; Republicans are more likely than Democrats to also choose nuclear energy, fossil fuels or whatever is cheapest.
The survey asked which energy sources should be used to power AI data centers, and people could choose more than one. Renewable energy is the most common choice (50%), well ahead of “whatever is cheapest” (27%), nuclear energy (17%) and fossil fuels (9%). Another 23% are not sure.
Renewable energy ranks first among Democrats, Republicans and independents alike. Democrats are 14 percentage points more likely than Republicans to choose renewable energy (58% versus 44%). Republicans are 8 points more likely to choose nuclear energy (23% versus 15%), 7 points more likely to choose fossil fuels (15% versus 8%) and 8 points more likely to choose whatever is cheapest (32% versus 24%).
Independents fall between the parties on renewable energy (47%) and are close to Democrats on whatever is cheapest (25%), nuclear energy (15%) and fossil fuels (7%). They are also the most likely to say they are not sure (29%, compared with 20% of Democrats and 20% of Republicans).
Views on government energy investment differ more by party. On a separate question about increased government investment in energy sources, 65% of Republicans support more investment in fossil fuels, compared with 31% of Democrats, and 56% of Republicans support more investment in nuclear energy, compared with 37% of Democrats. Support for more investment in renewable energy is higher among Democrats (79%) than Republicans (61%). The two sets of questions are not directly comparable, but the differences run in the same direction.
Preferences for renewable power also differ from state to state, from 38% in Mississippi to 63% in the District of Columbia (see Section 13).

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
How far apart are the parties?
The Republican–Democratic gap in trust in AI companies is 11 percentage points. Half of Republicans (50%) trust AI companies, while 61% of Democrats and 66% of independents do not. On the seven-point party scale, pure independents have the lowest level of trust (32%) and strong Republicans the highest (52%).
Half of Republicans trust AI companies “a lot” or “some.” A majority of Democrats (61%) and independents (66%) say “not too much” or “not at all.” The Republican–Democratic gap in trust is 11 percentage points.
The three-way party breakdown hides the shape. On the seven-point scale, trust falls across the Republican side — 52% for strong Republicans, 46% for not very strong Republicans and 43% for Republican leaners — and reaches its lowest point among pure independents (32%) and Democratic leaners (33%). On the Democratic side, trust rises to 40% among not very strong Democrats before dipping to 39% among strong Democrats.
Independents report the highest distrust of AI companies (66%), and on six of the seven measures in the third chart below they report lower trust, support or willingness than either party; the exception is renewable energy, where they fall between the two. They are the least willing to host a data center (16%) and the least supportive of government retraining (53%), even though that item shows one of the smallest partisan gaps in the survey. They are also the least likely to agree that technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy (50%, compared with 59% of Democrats and 55% of Republicans), so their lower scores do not map neatly onto pro- or anti-industry sentiment.
Pure independents are one of the largest groups in the survey. They account for 8,508 respondents, just 15 fewer than strong Democrats, the largest category on the seven-point scale among those who answered the trust question. Any account of AI politics built only from a Democrat-versus-Republican comparison leaves out a large group whose answers often fall below both parties rather than between them.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.


Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
Where is there a bipartisan consensus?
Democrats and Republicans are within four percentage points on four AI-policy questions: government retraining, lifelong learning accounts, opposing advanced-AI exports, and whether technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy. Independents fall below both parties on three of the four measures and are close to them on exports.
Support for government retraining is nearly identical across parties. Among Democrats, 63% support government retraining programs for workers affected by AI, compared with 64% of Republicans.
Portable lifelong learning accounts draw virtually identical support. A worker-owned retraining account that travels between jobs draws support from 56% of Democrats and 57% of Republicans.
Majorities in both parties say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy. 59% of Democrats and 55% of Republicans agree. Republicans are more trusting of AI companies overall, yet a majority of them still agree.
Democrats and Republicans are also closely aligned on advanced-AI exports. Among Democrats, 40% say the United States should oppose exporting advanced AI, compared with 42% of Republicans.
Independents fall below both parties on three of the four measures. They are less supportive of retraining (53%) and lifelong learning accounts (47%) and less likely to say technology leaders have too much influence (50%) — between 5 and 12 percentage points below the two parties, calculated before rounding (the rounded figures in the chart give 5 to 11). On exports they are close to both parties: 39% say the United States should oppose exporting advanced AI.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
Do tech workers simply defer to tech elites?
Tech workers combine high trust in AI companies with concern about tech leaders’ influence. 75% trust AI companies, while 73% say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy, compared with 56% of workers overall.
High trust in AI companies coexists with concern about tech leaders’ policy influence. Tech workers are the most trusting of AI companies and the most likely to say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy — 73%, compared with 56% of all workers. The chart treats trust and concern about influence as separate dimensions rather than opposite ends of one scale.
Across the public, trusting AI companies and wanting tech leaders to have less say over AI policy coexist. Among Americans who trust AI companies “a lot,” 57% say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy, close to the 61% among those who trust them “not at all”; only 14% of the most trusting disagree. Agreement is lowest in the middle of the trust scale (50% among those who trust AI companies “some”), where more people choose “neither.” Tech workers are the clearest case of a wider pattern: trust in the companies does not translate into deference to their leaders. The grid below shows who sits in each combination. Information and technology workers are 3.2 times as likely as all workers to trust AI companies “a lot” and agree that tech leaders have too much influence. Arts workers are overrepresented in the “strongly agree,” “agree” and “neither” squares of the “not at all” column, and adults without a high-school diploma in its “neither,” “disagree” and “strongly disagree” squares.
The same pattern remains after adjustment. Holding education, income, age, gender and party constant, technology workers are 22 percentage points more trusting of AI companies than otherwise similar workers outside the industry and 9 percentage points more likely to say technology leaders have too much influence over AI policy.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
How much do Americans trust AI companies?
Most Americans do not trust AI companies to do what is right. 60% say they trust AI companies “not too much” or “not at all,” while 40% say “a lot” or “some.” Only 9% say they trust them “a lot.”
The survey asked how much people trust AI (artificial intelligence) companies to do what is right, on a four-point scale from “a lot” to “not at all.”
31% say they do not trust AI companies “at all,” and another 28% say “not too much.” On the trusting side, 31% say “some” and 9% say “a lot.”
The national figure has remained near 40% across the three times the question has been asked: 39% in December 2025, 39% in the May–July 2026 survey and 40% in this survey. The partisan gap widened over the same period.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
Who trusts AI companies?
Trust rises with education and household income and is higher among men and in cities. It is lowest among 18-to-24-year-olds, at 30% — the age group most likely to have used AI.
Men report higher trust in AI companies than women. 46% of men trust AI companies “a lot” or “some,” compared with 36% of women, a gap of 10 percentage points.
Young adults report the lowest trust despite the highest exposure to AI. Trust is 30% among 18-to-24-year-olds, rises to 45% among 25-to-44-year-olds, then eases to 41% and 38% in the two older groups. 89% of 18-to-24-year-olds have used an AI tool, compared with 54% of adults 65 and older, and 63% of the youngest group describe themselves as skilled with AI. Among those who work, they are also the most likely to say AI will eventually cost people who do work like theirs their jobs (60%), and they are the most opposed to AI in hiring decisions (59%).
Trust rises with education, especially at the graduate level. It is 36%, 38% and 37% across the first three education categories, then rises to 43% among those with a bachelor’s degree and 54% among graduate-degree holders.
Trust also rises with household income. It is 37% in households earning under $50,000, 41% between $50,000 and $100,000, and 53% at $100,000 or more.
Urban adults report higher trust than rural adults. Trust is 44% in urban areas, 40% in the suburbs and 35% in rural areas.
Trust also varies across racial and ethnic groups. Asian (48%), Black (46%) and Hispanic (43%) Americans report higher trust than white Americans (39%); Native Americans report the lowest among the named groups (34%), about the same as the other race/ethnicity category (34%). These are overlapping indicators — respondents could select more than one — so the groups are not mutually exclusive.
These characteristics overlap: education and income travel together, age is tied to both, and race is associated with age, education and party in this sample. Each comparison here describes one characteristic at a time and does not hold the others constant.

Source: CHIP50 Survey of U.S. Adults, June 21 – August 11, 2026, weighted national sample.
Does any of this vary by state?
Yes, and on some measures the state differences are substantial. The map below shows the survey estimate for every state and DC across a range of AI questions. The differences are largest for self-rated AI skill, trust in AI companies and views of data centers, while the share who rate “concerned” 8 to 10 on a 1-to-10 scale describing their feelings about the rise of AI is relatively similar across states.
The map shows the raw survey results. Choose a question to see how responses vary across the country. Because each state estimate is based on a sample, small differences between states should not be treated as precise rankings. The map is most useful for seeing broad patterns rather than deciding that one state is definitively higher or lower than another.
Some measures vary more across states than others. After taking the uncertainty in each state’s survey estimate into account, the survey shows comparatively larger state differences in self-rated AI skill, trust in AI companies, some perceptions of data centers, and the preference for powering data centers with renewable energy. The share who rate “concerned” 8 to 10 on the 1-to-10 feelings scale varies much less.
The next question names the states at the top and bottom of the measures that vary most.
data highlights
Fielded June 21 – August 11, 2026 | Respondents 38,375 | Method weighted national sample
About this series: This is the first report in a CHIP50 series on public opinion about AI. Later reports will cover topics such as AI in workplaces and hiring, and student use of AI in education.
citation
Lazer, D., Uslu, A. A., Wihbey, J., Zomer, A., & Bernt, S. (2026). Divided on AI, Wary of Its Power (IIID Research Report). Institute for Information, the Internet & Democracy, Northeastern University. https://www.nuinfoinstitute.org/publications-1/divided-on-ai-wary-of-its-power.
topics
Public Opinion
Artificial Intelligence
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